Shared decision making has become an ideal in contemporary clinical practice, and guidelines recommend exploring patients' preferences and providing them with options so they can make informed decisions. This paper examines how the ideal of sharedness is maintained and negotiated through epistemic and deontic resources in secondary care consultations where patients are given a choice between invasive and non-invasive treatment options. The analysis suggests that the physician's presentation of treatment options is often tilted in favor of one proposal over the other, yet giving the patient the right to make the final decision. The patients on the other hand regularly resist this responsibility by claiming lack of epistemic authority (e.g. I know nothing about it) or by making the decision contingent on the physician taking a stronger deontic stance (e.g. if you think so). This may be characterized as an inverted use of deontic authority from both parties: Physicians give patients deontic rights in their pursuit of independent commitment to their preferred option, while patients orient to physicians' epistemic and deontic rights as a way of resisting to commit to the physicians' propositions. These conflicting orientations to epistemic and deontic authority counteract the ideal of shared decision making. 
Introduction
Patient autonomy has gained a prominent position in medical ethics. It is generally recognized and implemented in health policies and contemporary clinical guidelines through the principles of patient-centeredness that encourage patient involvement in care, especially through shared decision making (Barry & Edgman-Levitan, 2012; Kristvik, 2011 ; "Lov om pasient-og brukerrettigheter [Patients' Rights Act]," 1999; Mead & Bower, 2000) . Evidence indicates beneficial outcomes of interventions on patient-centeredness and shared decision making, although central outcome measures such as health status and concordance are limited or provide mixed results (Crawford et al., 2002; Dwamena et al., 2012) . More unambiguous are reports from observational studies, indicating that the doctor-centered approach is tenacious and that patients still have a limited degree of participation in decision making (Braddock III et al., 1999; Campion et al., 2002) .
Studies also indicate that preferences for being informed and participate in decision making vary amongst patients (de Haes, 2006; Degner & Sloan, 1992; Swenson et al., 2004) , and Elwyn (2012 Elwyn ( , p. 1363 notes that: "Some patients initially decline decisional responsibility role, and are wary about participating". de Haes (2006) takes a step further by pointing out that patient-centeredness, understood as "paying attention to psychosocial issues, to stimulate autonomy and empowerment, among others by giving information and sharing decisions" might not be appropriate or effective for all patients. Rather, being patient-centered "in the original sense may imply the opposite" (2006, p. 296) . de Haes suggests that this may be related to the potential burden of making choices as described in Schwartz (2004) , i.e. through anticipated regret, where "one may worry about the outcome and feel responsible if such outcome turns out to be negative" (2006, p. 296) . Thus, the assumption within patient-centered approaches that patients want to (and should) be involved and participate actively in decision making has been contested in various ways.
This brief overview indicate a complex and ambiguous picture that calls for closer investigation on an area that has received less attention: how participants themselves understand and orient to the task of making and sharing decisions in actual consultations (Seedhouse, 2005; Toerien et al., 2013) . More specifically, we will explore how the ideal of sharedness is maintained in secondary care consultations where patients are given a choice between invasive and non-invasive treatment options. Drawing on conversation analytic (CA) principles and findings, we will focus on how participants deploy epistemic and deontic resources in negotiating these decisions.
Conversation analytic studies have nuanced the general picture of patients' limited participation in decision making. Subtle practices patients deploy for participating in treatment negotiations and even influencing outcomes have been identified (e.g. Teas Gill, 2005) , and Stivers' (2006) influential studies have documented that treatment decisions are oriented to as the responsibility of both physician and patient (or parent) , in that acceptance of physicians' treatment recommendations regularly are treated as relevant upon completion. Most of the CA literature has until recently focused on primary care interactions, and described medical decision making as a three-part structure, where physicians' treatment recommendations are treated as proposals that must be accepted before moving on to a next activity. When patient resistance is forthcoming, e.g. by withholding acceptance, negotiation regularly follows (Koenig, 2011; Stivers, 2005) .
However, recently, in examining interactions from Polish secondary care, Weidner (2012) suggests that invasive treatment recommendations are presented more cautiously than non-invasive recommendations in that physicians' provision of accounts (i.e. a medical rationale) seem to be treated as appropriate before acceptability can be reached. Studying British neurology interactions, Toerien et al (2013) has called for studies with a broadened scope that also includes evidence of physicians' efforts to offer choice; thus examining practices more in line with current policies. In their recent study, Toerien et al (2013) compare 'recommending' and 'option-listing' and show that these two practices provide different response slots for patients. While recommendations make acceptance the relevant next action, optionlisting provides a more open-ended slot for patients' announcements of their selection. The authors argue that this has implications for the distribution of medical authority, where "option-listing is a practice whereby doctors relinquish at least a little of their authority" (p. 885).
This study will go further in that vein, in examining consultations from Norwegian secondary care where patients are given a possibility to choose between invasive and non-invasive treatment options. Invasive treatments are diagnostic and treatment-related procedures that involve entry into the body (i.e. biopsy, surgery, and anesthesia). Non-invasive treatments include all other treatments and minor tests, i.e. self-administrated drugs, blood tests, as well as the option of "watchful waiting" (Elwyn et al., 2000) . As invasive treatments are always associated with some degree of medical uncertainty and risk, the decisions to be made may be seen as more serious and difficult, especially for patients (Grimen, 2009 ). This may affect the dynamics of the interactions in that the question of who is responsible for making the decisions is unclear: On the one hand, patients seem to resist making decisions based on their lack of knowledge, while on the other hand physicians resist making the final decisions with reference to the fact that the patient's preference or experience of illness should be the basis of the decision. This may be seen as a twoway struggle of avoiding sole responsibility, in that both physicians and patients confer the right to decide and thereby also the responsibility for the decision to their interlocutor.
These negotiations seem to operate at the intersection of two questions: First, who should make the decision, which falls within the deontic domain, and second, what knowledge should be the basis of the decision, which falls within the epistemic domain.
1.1.
Epistemic and deontic rights A person's epistemic domain comprises his or her knowledge and personal experiences (Heritage, 2012; Stivers & Rossano, 2010 (Heritage, 2012) .
Deontic rights on the other hand relate to someone's right to determine future actions (Stevanovic, 2013) . While in traditional medicine this has been seen as the physicians' responsibility (i.e. the notion of "doctor's order"), based on their medical expertise and experience (epistemic status), contemporary guidelines for patientcentered approaches recommend a more even distribution of these rights, acknowledging also patients' deontic rights; For instance the Norwegian Patients'
Rights Act (1999) states that patients have the right to participate in choosing between available and appropriate examination and treatment methods. Thus, the epistemic status associated with medical knowledge has traditionally given physicians superior deontic rights, i.e. the right to decide what treatments to choose.
Patients' epistemic and deontic rights on the other hand, have traditionally not been acknowledged, but as already mentioned, this is currently undergoing change due to the movement of patient-centered care which encourages patients to become equal partners in the decision-making based on their expertise on own health and a recognition of patient autonomy.
Deontic rights can be claimed with varying strength or degree of necessity, positioning them on a deontic gradient (Stevanovic, 2013) . Expressions of possibility (e.g. you can have a short anesthesia for that) and desirability (e.g. I would like to refer you to…) set up shallower deontic gradients compared to stronger claims of necessity (e.g. you have to quit smoking), setting up a steeper gradient. Claims along this deontic gradient will be referred to as deontic stance. Physicians' provision of options can thus be seen as setting up a shallower deontic gradient compared to recommendations, suggesting a more equal distribution of rights (Toerien et al., 2013) . Nevertheless, differences in deontic stance may constrain the patient's deontic rights to varying degrees. While examples as the first one ("you can have") allocate substantial deontic rights to the patient, implying a shallow deontic gradient, the latter ("you have to") marks the decision as non-negotiable, hence suggesting a steeper deontic gradient. This implies that the response of the interlocutor is crucial in accepting or resisting the claim to authority. As Stevanovic (2013, p. 20) points out, "authority is not primarily about someone claiming authority, but it is about others accepting someone as an authority" (orig. emphasis).
Data and method
Videotaped non-psychiatric consultations in a Norwegian teaching hospital form the data for this study (see Fossli Jensen et al., 2011) . The physicians who participated were randomized, so inclusion was not based on physicians' interests or own choice. 1 For the objectives of this study a subset of approximately 100 consultations were reviewed. Out of these, we identified 11 consultations where more than one treatment alternative was explicitly brought up as a possible option, and where at least one of the options were invasive in character (i.e. surgery). The consultations are drawn from gynecology, urology, gastroenterology, internal infection medicine, orthopedics and anesthesia. Examples from four of these consultations will be presented in this paper. They represent variation in regard to the medical problem at hand and involve four different physicians. Ongoing studies of the larger data corpus (320 consultations) indicate that only a minority of the consultations involve characteristics of shared decision making such as provision of option (Ofstad, pers.
comm.), so the selected consultations are examples from the more patient-centered consultations in the corpus.
CA was used for analyzing the data (Heritage, 1984; Schegloff, 2007; Sidnell & Stivers, 2013 ) (for reviews of medical interactions, see Gill and Roberts (2013) ; Heritage and Maynard (2006) ), and the selected consultations were transcribed according to Jefferson's (2004) transcription system. We analyze sequences where physicians introduce a choice about treatment plans, thus making a decision from the patient conditionally relevant (e.g. to make a choice, express preferred option or commitment). In these sequences treatment decisions are presented as 'to be made', implying co-decision (Collins et al., 2005) , or in deontic terms; set up deontic gradients that give the patient a certain degree of authority in making the decision.
Analysis includes first mentions of alternative options (1), as well as subsequent initiatives to reach a decision (2-6), since no cases in our data are resolved in the same sequence as the treatment options are first presented (see Weidner, 2012 on negotiation of invasive treatment recommendations). (6) constitutes a contrast in that the patient takes a markedly different deontic stance compared to the other cases.
Introducing options
Example (1) and (2) are drawn from a urology encounter where the aim is to make anesthetic arrangements before a surgical intervention. The extracts illustrate how the physician and patient confer to the other the deontic right to decide as a way to promote their own action-plans.
In (1) and line 1 can be heard as addressing this concern, while simultaneously introducing talk about specific types of anesthesia:
(1) ANESTHESIA (0:03:52.8) The two options are introduced in lines 11-17. The projection of two alternatives is signaled early in the turn ("either") in line 11, and the patient does not treat it as completed before the second alternative is presented in line 17. Although more than one option is projected from the outset, and the same modal verb "can" is used in both, they are not presented as equally favored. Most obvious is the parenthetical assessment of spinal anesthesia as "something we prefer" (line 15), following a delayed acknowledgement token from the patient that may signal resistance towards this option (lines 12-14). More subtle is the shift from "we" in line 11 and 15, to "you" in line 17, implying a shift in whose decision it is; while the medical "we" would choose spinal anesthesia, "you" have the possibility of choosing something else, hence conveying a subtle shift in responsibility, where the responsibility lies with the patient in choosing the latter option. This is also explicated in the increment in line 15 that portrays spinal anesthesia as the routine option, indirectly drawing on the deontic authority of the medical community. 3
The patient's response (lines 18, 20) first treats the presentation of options as eliciting a display of preference: "mt yes. I would rather the nex-", probably heard as referring to the second alternative, where "next" is an unidiomatic reference to "the latter". This interpretation is strengthened by the fact that he starts his response by a positive response token, which is interpretable as a confirmation of the latter 3 Later in the consultation the physician explicitly states that spinal anesthesia is the routine option for this kind of procedure.
alternative, given the preference for contiguity in conversation (Sacks, 1973) . Also the before mentioned delayed acknowledgement of the first option (lines 12-14) and the non-straightforward, hesitant response (lines 18-20) indicate disagreement towards the physician's favored option. However, the patient cuts of just before completion ("nex-"), suggesting that he treated the abandoned turn in line 18 as somewhat inappropriate (Drew et al., 2013) . The patient instead provides a disclaimer of knowledge: "(so but) I don't know anything about it" (line 20). The selfinterruption (line 18) and disclaimer (line 20) works to withdraw, or at least reduce, the deontic stance implied by the abandoned statement, namely that the patient decided to have general anesthesia in opposition to the physician's opinion. That would have been a disaffiliative action claiming strong deontic rights. Note also that the patient's altered response draws on their asymmetrical epistemic status: in claiming lack of knowledge he indirectly confers to the medical expert to be the knowledgeable, hence the proper decision-maker. Nevertheless, the patient also manages to convey his favored, but opposing option, but the abandoned turn together with the disclaimer works to avoid making it hearable as decisionimplicative.
Subsequent invitations to decide
The following example (2) is from the same encounter and exhibits where the physician several minutes later again moves towards reaching a decision since the patient has not yet committed to any of the options. In the meantime the physician has performed a physical examination that confirmed spinal anesthesia to be possible and pointed to advantages of that option. In this subsequent invitation to decide, the deontic gradient has become steeper in that the physician only mentions one of the options by explicitly asking for permission to try spinal anesthesia first The physician's request for permission (lines 1-2) refers to the option of trying spinal anesthesia as a first option, and if that doesn't work satisfactory, they will turn to general anesthesia. The request seems to balance two contrasting deontic stances.
The formulation "is it okay for you", with a prolonged "yo:u", represents a request for permission, thus acknowledging the patient's deontic right to accept or reject this option. However, the polar interrogative presenting only one of the options, displays a preference for a confirming response (Raymond, 2003) , thus adding pressure to affiliate with the physician's deontic stance. And even more importantly, it does not refer to the contingency that the patient had previously expressed a personal preference for the other option.
The patient responds ambiguously. The Norwegian response particle "jada"
(composed of the response word "ja" (yes) and the reinforcing particle "da") conveys granting of a request, but can be heard as implying some reluctance. The disaffiliative stance is further expressed by the patient's simultaneous head shake and subsequent account: "if you think so? then I will of (course not make it) difficu(h)lt(h)?" (lines 3-6). This account reduces his own deontic rights by inviting the physician's medical opinion and concerns for practical efficiency to be the proper grounds for the decision. Also the interspersed laughter in the word "difficult"
indicates an orientation to the potential delicacy of rejecting the suggestion (Haakana, 2001) . So the patient gives the final deontic responsibility for the decision back to the physician, displaying willingness to collaborate and act as a "good patient".
In response, the physician first confirms spinal anesthesia as her favored option with a "yes" produced with final intonation (line 7). However, she immediately backs down from her confirmation by reducing the deontic force of her previous actions to a 'mere recommendation', thus portraying herself as recommender and not decision-maker (line 7). This works to pursue a more independent expression of commitment from the patient. At the same time the 'recommendation' gains authority from her epistemic status as a medical expert, and is further reinforced by the addition of an argument that orients to a risk factor of general anesthesia (lines 7-11). Notably, the patient only responds minimally (lines 8, 10, 12), withholding any signs of commitment (Stevanovic, 2012) . The physician orients to this potential resistance by further backing down in that she explicitly confers to him the right to decline, hence insisting on the patient's deontic right despite the adverse medical recommendation (lines 13-14). Once again, the patient refrains from making a decision (lines 15-16), and instead restates his fear of going through a painful procedure and being awake to observe what is going on "down there" (data not shown) (Koenig, 2011) .
In (1) and (2) the physician claims a rather strong deontic authority, with a steeper deontic gradient in (2). This is evidenced by the fact that only one of the options is explicitly mentioned, and that the patient's deontic right is transformed from expressing a personal preference to giving permission to follow the physician's recommendation. Nevertheless, in the face of potential resistance, the physician backs down and claims a shallower deontic gradient by holding the patient responsible for making the final decision. The patient similarly responds to the physician's potential resistance to his preferred option by backing down and renouncing his deontic rights. In that way he manages to push the responsibility for the decision back to the physician and avoids committing to an option he is unsure about. Thus, in dealing with opposing treatment preference they both confer the decision to the other, renouncing their own rights to decide and insisting on the other's deontic (and in the physician's case also epistemic) authority. So both parties can be seen to use an inverted form of deontic authority as a means for pursuing their favored outcome, whilst simultaneously avoiding taking full responsibility (Heritage, pers. comm.) .
Example (3) illustrates a similar case, but here it is the physician who advocates the most invasive option. This is from gynecology, and the elderly patient, who has been suffering from incontinence, has expressed to have only minor symptoms with a less invasive treatment; a vaginal coil she has had for six months. The physician has nevertheless introduced a more invasive treatment option (surgery) as a favorable option (data not shown). 4 So the following case is not the first attempt at proposing a decision, but a subsequent pursuit of acceptance (Davidson, 1984 The formulation strongly projects agreement (Antaki, 2008) , but the patient's curled "ja" (yes), projecting non-alignment (Lindström, 2009) , is modified immediately with a repeated claim of insufficient knowledge (line 5). As in (1), this patient also hesitates to choose the option that she seems to favor, by accounting for her lack of knowledge (Keevallik, 2011) . Furthermore, the claim is modified by the Norwegian particle "jo", which is a common ground marker (Fretheim, 1991) . The particle may contribute to turning this into a "your fault" account, "accusing the questioner of asking an epistemically ill-fitted question" (Heinemann et al., 2011, p. 123) , implying that the physician should know that this is a question she is unable to answer.
Instead of e.g. treating the patient's response as a request for more information, the physician treats it as a potential disconfirmation in that he reverses the formulation to not being "completely negative towards surgery either" (lines 8-10). By continuing to draw inferences about the patient's treatment preferences, the physician ignores her claim of not having sufficient epistemic grounds for making the decision. While the physician is initiating a turn increment in the form of a conditional clause (line 10), the patient produces an overlapping response, also in the form of a conditional clause, thus seeming like a collaborative completion: "[yeah if] I have to" (line 11). However, the response is disaffiliative with respect to the stance expressed by the physician in that it is presented as only a partial agreement, with acceptance being presented as contingent on necessity ("if I have to"). Determining whether this option is necessary is indirectly portrayed as belonging to the physician, based on his medical judgment.
Thus, by using a similar contingent acceptance as in (2), the patient confers the deontic responsibility back to the physician. In response, the physician seeks confirmation with a repeat (line 12), giving the patient an opportunity to modify her conditional acceptance. However, the patient confirms with a repeat, produced with falling intonation and additional stress on "must", upgrading the assertiveness of the claim (line 13). So the patient implicitly maintains her previously expressed deontic stance that it is not mainly up to her personal preference to decide, but that the decision should be informed by medical efficacy and necessity, thus implying that it is the physician's responsibility.
The cases so far have involved expressions of conflicting treatment preferences. The preference for agreement might be a plausible explanation of patients' reluctance towards making decisions in opposition to physicians' deontic stances (Pomerantz, 1984) . However, that doesn't fully explain the next example, where the patient refrains from making a decision although both parties have moved towards the option of surgery as the most appropriate, compared to the other option of "watchful waiting"
(data not shown).
The male patient in (4) and (5) has been suffering from heavy stomach pain caused by his gall bladder for over a year, but the last few months he reports to have had no attacks. Early on in the consultation the physician has proposed to either wait and see or do surgery, and the subsequent talk moves towards an agreement on scheduling the patient for surgery a few months ahead, so that the patient can allow some time to pass to see whether it might stabilize without intervention (data not shown). And in the beginning of this extract (lines 1-3) the physician sums up this previous talk, introducing it by the inference marker "så" (so): The physician's proposal (lines 1-3) is formulated as a conclusion following naturally from the previous talk, thus constituting an upgraded claim of deontic rights. The assertiveness of the claim is mitigated by the Norwegian hedge "vel", glossed as "I suppose". The particle is an "alter-oriented" epistemic modifier (Fretheim, 1981) ,
indicating that the truth of the claim is contingent upon acceptance by the interlocutor.
So the proposal does not only invite the patient to agree, but also to share epistemic responsibility for the claim. Receiving no uptake, the physician pursues agreement by adding a tag question as a turn increment (line 6).
A confirmation is then provided, but in a dispreferred format. The response token is considerably delayed, both by a 0.5 second silence and a lengthy in-breath (lines 7-8). It is also mitigated by a hand gesture conventionally signaling lack of knowledge (line 8) and a subsequent claim of not being sufficiently knowledgeable (lines 8-9).
While a straightforward confirmation could have made the way short to a definitive decision, the patient's extended response resists the deontic responsibility, based on a lack of epistemic authority. In this way he simultaneously treats the physician as the one who knows, thus the one with deontic authority to decide.
In overlap, the physician rejects this claim about his deontic authority using a "yes, but-format". And the subsequent account redefines the grounds for the decision as belonging within a different epistemic domain from the medical, namely within the patient's subjective experience; his "quality of life" (lines 10-13). After minimal uptake, the physician specifies this point by providing two candidate descriptions for the patient to choose between (lines 15-19). The first indicates an extreme and severe state, and thus seems to imply a need for surgery, whereas the latter describes less serious attacks without major effects on everyday function, implying that surgery may not be needed.
The patient's response first displays "troubles resistance" by not taking pain killers under any circumstances (lines 21-25) (Jefferson, 1988) , before he provides a description that is hearable as a personalized version of the former candidate description, using "extreme case formulations" such as "hell" and describing periods of isolation as his way of dealing with the attacks (lines 25-30) (Pomerantz, 1986) .
The response thus aligns with the physician's implicit request for information about his personal experience, but does not display deontic rights to proceed to a decisionimplicative conclusion. The physician then prepares to speak with an in breath and turns firmly towards his computer (line 29), possibly indicating that a conclusion has been reached. The rest of this sequence is analyzed in (5) below.
What has characterized the examples so far (1-4) is that the physicians ask the patients to make a treatment decision, but that the patients persistently resist, claiming insufficient knowledge relative to the physician. The physicians claim some epistemic and deontic rights by conveying their stance towards the options as more or less recommendable, but insist on the patients' right to decide. The result is a process of negotiation where both parties disclaim their own deontic authority and instead confer it to the interlocutor. The participants' deontic stance is here explicitly grounded in two competing epistemic domains in that the parties invoke different types of knowledge and experience as relevant for making the decision: Somewhat paradoxically, the patients claim that it is the physician's assessment of medical necessity that grounds deontic authority, whereas the physicians claim that it is the patient's subjective experience or preference. Furthermore, the physicians seem to exert an additional type of authority, in that they are the ones who determine when it is the patient's knowledge that counts.
Reaching a decision
Example (5) illustrates how the participants in the previous example (4) manage to reach a decision. After the physician has clearly recognized that he is committed to the option, the patient accepts the proposal. The extract follows immediately after (4): The physician's multi-unit turn in lines 31-37 follows immediately after the patient's symptom description in (4). It starts by a turn preface in the form of a disclaimer, denying any intention by the physician of exerting deontic pressure (line 31). As a projective disclaimer, the preface both prepares the interlocutor for what is to come, namely something that might be considered inappropriate, and simultaneously instructs him not to take it that way (Hewitt & Stokes, 1975) . In the rest of the turn, the physician provides evidence of negative prospects, taking a strong epistemic stance ("the only thing I know" and "it is very very likely") and drawing on medical authority ("with that illness history"). So the physician claims strong epistemic rights, defining the grounds for the decision, whilst insisting on the patient's deontic right to make the final decision. That surgery is indeed the logical consequence of the preceding talk is also evident in the subsequent proposal, initiated with the concluding particle "så" (so): "so if you give me a green light then I can set you up"
(lines 39-40). This formulation conveys that the physician is committed to the proposal; he only needs a green light from the patient. And the patient, in overlap with an inaudible alternative option projected by the incrementally added adverb "otherwise" (line 41), affiliates with the proposal: "yeah (give) then I give you I'll give you a green light" (line 42). The recycled wording and extended turn format makes it hearable as a commitment to a future course of action (Lindström, 1999) .
In (5) the physician seems to exploit his epistemic authority to railroad the patient into a decision for surgery. Thus this sequence may be more in line with the traditional proposal-acceptance format as described in e.g. Stivers (2006) , in that the patient is only required to accept the proposal instead of making a more independent commitment. Nevertheless, the physician maintains the patient's ultimate deontic right, and he builds his proposal on epistemic insights from the patient's life-world experience and medical experience, actions associated with patient-centered approaches. Furthermore, somewhat paradoxically, the responsibility for the (outcomes of the) decision may thus be more evenly distributed here compared to e.g. the option-listing in example (1), where the responsibility for choosing general anesthesia seemed to be placed mainly with the patient. This may point to some
underestimated outcomes of what constitutes a patient-centered approach.
On some occasions, patients claim stronger deontic rights, and in disagreement with the physician. The following, and last case is a striking example of that.
Patient claiming deontic rights
Early in this gynecological consultation the patient has confirmed, on the physician's request, that she wishes to remove her uterus due to serious bleeding disturbances.
The physician subsequently discourages this repeatedly, and recommends a less invasive procedure as a possible first step (data not shown). The following extract is therefore a short glimpse of a long negotiation, but may illustrate some core characteristics. In lines 1-4 the physician highlights risks of doing surgery, before he urges her to have removal of uterus as a "last resort" in line 7: As the list of risk factors (lines 1-4) doesn't trigger any uptake that could signal agreement (lines 5-6), the physician's directive (line 7) pursues it explicitly. The imperative form and marked stress on "h:ave" claims strong deontic stance that heavily projects agreement, while simultaneously orienting to the patient as the ultimate decision-maker, thus with the deontic right to decide.
The patient's response is prepared with strong markers of dispreference: There is a remarkably long gap of two seconds followed by a long, audible nasal in breath that, together with an animated crossing of her arms (lines 8-9) , marks what to come as a highly disaffiliative action. This is oriented to by the physician, who starts bolstering his proposal by an appeal to trust in him (line 10) even before she has started talking.
Although the preparatory work builds up to a confrontation, the rejection itself is not articulated explicitly, possibly due to the fact that her opposing stance has already been stated previously. Instead follows a twofold account that does not respond to the physician's arguments in any way: "I'm very dete(H)rmi(hh)ned I can't handle it any more?" (lines 11-12). The first part accounts for her strong deontic stance, implying that she will not change her mind. The laughter particles in the key word "determined" also displays awareness of her inappropriate patient behavior in not accepting the physician's recommendation (Haakana, 2001 ). The second part constitutes an account for her rejection, produced with an emphatic voice on the verb "O:rker" (handle). The adverb "anymore" shows "troubles resistance" by indicating that this is something she has endured for a long time (actually over 30 years, according to her problem presentation, data not shown), and implies grounds reaching beyond a personal wish. The patient's response thus in several ways displays a struggle for deontic authority, while attending to its inappropriateness. So in this extract the patient does extra interactional work to uphold her right to decide, in opposition to the physician´s clearly formulated recommendation. In order to counter the physician's strong deontic stance, the patient has to herself take a strong and unambiguous deontic stance.
4. Discussion 4.1.
Summary of findings
The present study has examined sequences where patients were offered a choice between invasive and non-invasive treatment proposals, focusing on how the ideal of sharedness was maintained and negotiated through epistemic and deontic resources. We have demonstrated how participants negotiate the distribution of epistemic and deontic rights and responsibilities, and that this was relevant in the process of reaching a treatment decision. The participants negotiated these rights and responsibilities both in regard to the question of whose decision or deontic right it was to decide, as well as on what epistemic grounds the decision should be made. were agreed to belong within the biomedical domain, the responsibility for the decision would fall on the physician, while the decisional responsibility would fall on the patient if the patient's subjective experience was given priority. This negotiation can be characterized as a struggle between 'epistemics of expertise' and 'epistemics of experience' (Heritage, 2013, p. 392) , here used mainly as a resource for decreasing the speakers' own deontic responsibility in favor of their interlocutor, by reference to the other's primary epistemic domain. However, important epistemic asymmetries seemed to be maintained through the physicians' indication of degree of necessity (deontic stance) in the proposed options, and in that the physicians seemed to be the ones who determined whether the patient's experience was relevant or not.
Furthermore, patients recurrently drew upon epistemic and deontic resources in their disaligning responses to physicians' claims of deontic rights and responsibilities.
Patients resisted deontic rights to decide based on inferior epistemic or deontic authority. In the former case, patients oriented to a lack of own knowledge or to physicians' superior knowledge (e.g. "I don't know", "this you know much more about than me"). Stevanovic (2012) found that recipients of proposals treated access to the subject matter as a precondition for joint decisions, thus not-knowing may function as a way to avoid responsibility. Patients seemed to use such accounts when they were invited to choose in accordance with their own expressed option, as in (1), (3, line 5) and (4). When patients on the other hand were confronted with options that went against their own expressed preference, but were the physicians' recommended option, patients regularly provided acceptance that was contingent on the physician taking a stronger deontic stance (e.g. "if I have to"), thus conferring the deontic responsibility back to the physician, as in (2) and (3, line 11). This might be characterized as an inverted use of deontic authority from both parties: Physicians gave patients deontic rights in their pursuit of independent commitment to their preferred option, possibly relying on their epistemic status as medical experts, while patients oriented to physicians' epistemic and deontic rights as a way of resisting to commit to the physicians' propositions (Heritage, pers. comm.) . Thus, displays of subordination (Griswold, 2007) may also be a way to promote one's own action-plans while maintaining the ideal of sharedness, that requires commitment from both parties for reaching a decision (Stevanovic, 2012) .
4.2.
Implications for conversation analytic research
We will briefly point to two contributions of this study to conversation analytic research. The first is a theoretical contribution, where we have started to explore the complex interplay between epistemic and deontic resources and gradients in an institutional setting of decision making. Further studies are needed to understand more fully the complexities and relations between these concepts in medical, as well as other (institutional) settings where decisions are made.
Additionally, the study contributes to a growing body of CA research on medical decision making in secondary care interactions. The study supports and expands on previous findings that indicate that the sequential pattern found in primary care
settings is challenged, suggesting that the classical proposal-acceptance structure needs adjustments to also capture shallower deontic gradients that provide wider response options for the patient (Toerien et al., 2013) . The more invasive and highstake character of many secondary care treatment proposals seem to affect the deontic gradient: Patients' may be given more deontic rights (and thus responsibility)
as decision-makers, suggesting a shallower deontic gradient in line with the ideals of shared decision making, whilst especially patients seem oriented to objective medical facts (epistemic authority) as a prerequisite for undergoing invasive treatments. So, characteristics in secondary care seem to adjust the dynamics of medical decisionmaking towards a shallower deontic gradient on the one hand (patient as final decision maker), while physicians' epistemic and deontic authority still pervades the process.
4.3.
Implications for research on patient-centeredness and shared decision making This study contributes with empirical, interactional evidence on how epistemic and deontic rights and responsibilities are negotiated in the interactional process of doing shared decision making (Pilnick, 2008) . A detailed analysis has pointed to the fine lines between empowerment and abandonment (Kristvik, 2011) , where the ideal within patient-centered approaches of empowering patients through offering choice in reality may be closer to abandonment when physicians simultaneously renounce responsibility for options they may not prefer. This resonates with Toerien et al (2011, p. 319 ) that suggest that the concept of choice "is not as simple as the literature may suggest, and that the simple course of telling clinicians to "offer patients more choice" may not achieve its objective". The unpredictable and potential long-lasting (negative and positive) consequences of invasive procedures as well as uncertain and contested medical knowledge (Grimen, 2009 ) may affect both parties' reluctance to make these decisions. Hence, this study offers insights to educators and researchers about specific dynamics that enhance or hamper the interactional realization of intended clinical practice, and indicating willingness to share epistemic and deontic responsibility for proposed options seems to be a crucial point for patients' willingness to participate.
204529).
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